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Abstract
Adversarial images are samples that are intentionally
modified to deceive machine learning systems. They are
widely used in applications such as CAPTHAs to help dis-
tinguish legitimate human users from bots. However, the
noise introduced during the adversarial image generation
process degrades the perceptual quality and introduces ar-
tificial colors; making it also difficult for humans to classify
images and recognize objects. In this paper, we propose a
method to enhance the perceptual quality of these adversar-
ial images. The proposed method is attack type agnostic and
could be used in association with the existing attacks in the
literature. Our experiments show that the generated adver-
sarial images have lower Euclidean distances to their orig-
inals while maintaining the same adversarial attack perfor-
mance. Distances are reduced by 5.88% to 41.27% with
an average reduction of 22% over the different attack and
network types.
1. Introduction
Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers andHumansApart - CAPTCHA, is a commonly
used method to validate human users. Image classification
based tests are intentionally designed to make bots fail to
classify images. Deep Neural Network (DNN) based meth-
ods [5, 11], which have recently been proven to be success-
ful in automated image classification, have been found to
be useful to bypass CAPTCHA security process. However,
these methods are vulnerable to specially generated adver-
sarial examples [6], which can be used in CAPTCHAs and
similar applications to make them more robust.
An adversarial attack perturbs the input image by adding
a non-random, network and input specific noise, to make its
automated classification difficult. This artificial noise also
makes it more difficult for the legitimate users to classify
the adversarial images especially when they are time lim-
ited [4]. So, two desired attributes of adversarial images
are: (i) they should successfully fool the machine learning
systems, (ii) they should introduce as little perceptual noise
as possible so that they do not pose any additional challenge
to the humans. In this paper, we propose a method for per-
ceptual enhancement of adversarial images to make them
closer to their noise-free originals and easier to process by
humans.
2. Proposed Method
The inputs of conventional DNNs are RGB images
and the attacks add noise to all three channels separately.
Adding independent and different amounts of noise to these
different channels results in artificial colors being intro-
duced as shown in Fig.1b, 1d, 1f. In addition, as the at-
tack modifies each pixel independently, it exhibits itself as a
visually distractive colored snow-like high-frequency noise
[1]. On the other hand, main distinguishing features (such
as shape and texture) for an object class can be obtained
from the luminance and adversarial noise added to the lu-
minance channel is expected to be more detrimental to the
network performance than the noise in the color channels.
So, we claim that lower noise levels could be obtained by
concentrating the attack on the luminance channel, which
in effect is expected to reduce the distractive colored snow-
like noise.
As conventional networks work with RGB images, the ad-
versarial noise calculation inherently makes use of R, G and
B channels. For the original image IR,G,B , attack algo-
rithm calculates the adversarial noise, NR,G,B , separately
for each channel. This noise is then added to the respective
channels of the original image to obtain adversarial image
AR,G,B as follows: AR,G,B = IR,G,B + NR,G,B . In this
work, we first convert the image and the adversarial noise
into YUV domain and obtain IY,U,V and NY,U,V respec-
tively. Then U and V coefficients of the noise, NU and
NV , are scaled by a factor 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Assuming that
the target object is closer to the center of the image, all the
noise channels NY,U,V are filtered with a 2D Gaussian ker-
nel placed at the center of the image to gradually reduce the
noise closer to the edges. The resulting noise is added in
YUV color space: AY,U,V = IY,U,V + NY,U,V . Then the
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Algorithm 1 Iteratively Finding the Minimum Adversarial
Noise
1: Convert the original image IR,G,B into YUV: IY,U,V
2: Initialize the best distance L′2 to a high number
3: while Attack is successful do
4: Run the attack to generate adversarial noise image
NR,G,B
5: Convert NR,G,B into YUV: NY,U,V
6: Scale the noise in U and V channels by a factor of
α, apply Gaussian smoothing G to all noise channels
and construct the adversarial image:
7: AY = IY +G(NY )
8: AU = IU +G(α×NU )
9: AV = IV +G(α×NV )
10: Convert AY,U,V into RGB: AR,G,B
11: Calculate the new distance L2 using AR,G,B and
IR,G,B
12: if L2 < L′2 and attack is successful then
13: Store the best attack:
14: A′R,G,B = AR,G,B
15: Store the minimum L2 value as the new mini-
mum
16: L′2 = L2
17: Decrease the attack strength ( for FGSM and
MIM, maximum iteration for C&W L2)
18: else return A′R,G,B
19: end if
20: end while
imageAY,U,V is converted back into RGB to allow process-
ing in conventional networks. This process reduces the total
amount of noise added to the original image and it might
cause the adversarial attack to fail. Hence an iterative pro-
cess is used as described in Alg.2 to find a stronger attack.
Although a stronger attack will increase the noise, overall
noise is lower due to the subsequent scaling of chrominance
values and the use of Gaussian kernel.
3. Dataset
NIPS 2017: Adversarial Learning Development Set [9]
consist of 1000 images having 299x299 resolution. Each
image corresponds to a different ImageNet 1000 category.
Image pixels are scaled to the range [0, 1]. All the images
are used in the experiments and overall L2 distances are
calculated as the average throughout all the images.
4. Experimental Setup
L0, L2, and L∞ distances are commonly measures to
quantify the perturbation added to the original image. L0
distance counts the number of pixels which were altered
during the adversarial process. L∞ distance shows the max-
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Figure 1: A sample image, its adversarial counterparts ob-
tained using different attacks and with the proposed method.
(a) Original image, (b) Baseline adversarial image (FGSM
attack), (c) Adversarial image obtained with α = 0 (FGSM
attack), (d) Baseline adversarial image (C&W L2 attack),
(e) Adversarial image obtained with α = 0 (C&W L2 at-
tack), (f) Baseline adversarial image (MIM attack), (g) Ad-
versarial image obtained with α = 0 (MIM attack)
Algorithm 2 Iteratively Finding the Minimum Adversarial
Noise
1: Convert the original image IR,G,B into YUV: IY,U,V
2: Initialize the best distance L′2 to a high number
3: while Attack is successful do
4: Run the attack to generate adversarial noise image
NR,G,B
5: Convert NR,G,B into YUV: NY,U,V
6: Scale the noise in U and V channels by a factor of
α, apply Gaussian smoothing G to all noise channels
and construct the adversarial image:
7: AY = IY +G(NY )
8: AU = IU +G(α×NU )
9: AV = IV +G(α×NV )
10: Convert AY,U,V into RGB: AR,G,B
11: Calculate the new distance L2 using AR,G,B and
IR,G,B
12: if L2 < L′2 and attack is successful then
13: Store the best attack:
14: A′R,G,B = AR,G,B
15: Store the minimum L2 value as the new mini-
mum
16: L′2 = L2
17: Decrease the attack strength ( for FGSM and
MIM, maximum iteration for C&W L2)
18: else return A′R,G,B
19: end if
20: end while
imum change due to the perturbation. Since our method
aims perceptual enhancement, we calculate L2 metric using
all the channels (1) in order to measure the total perturba-
tion. In this equation, I is the original image, A is the ad-
versarial image, w is the width and, h is the height of the
image. L2 distance gives a better indication of the overall
adversarial noise (high frequency noise which is distractive
to human visual system) compared to L0 and L∞.
L2 =
√√√√R,G,B∑
c
w∑
i=0
h∑
j=0
(Ici,j −Aci,j)2 (1)
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7], Momentum It-
erative Method (MIM) [3] and Carlini&Wagner L2 (C&W
L2) [2] attacks were used for experimental evaluation of the
proposed method as they are well-known milestone attacks.
FGSM [7] is a one-step gradient based approach which is
designed to be fast. For a given image I and corresponding
target y, it calculates the gradient of the loss, ∇IJ(I, y),
generally cross-entropy, with respect to I and multiplies
negative of the gradient sign with a constant  to generate
the adversarial noise. This noise is then added to the image
I to obtain the adversarial exampleA (2).
A = I −  sign (∇IJ(I, y)) (2)
MIM [3] is an iterative version of FGSM. It is designed
to attain the minimum adversarial example in T iterations.
At each iteration, MIM updates the accumulated the gra-
dient by using the current L1 normalized gradient of loss,
softmax cross-entropy, and previous accumulated gradient
gt multiplied by a decay factor µ (3). By this way, a mo-
mentum is used which makes the method more resilient to
small humps, narrow valleys, and poor local extremities.
Then the next adversarial example At+1 is obtained by
subtracting L2 normalized gt+1 multiplied with a constant
β = T .
gt+1 = µ · gt +
∇IJ (At, y)
‖∇IJ (At, y)‖1
(3)
At+1 = At − β ·
gt+1∥∥gt+1∥∥2 (4)
C&W L2 attack [2] aims to find the lowest perturbation
in L2 distance metric, also in an iterative manner. At each
iteration, the attack finds the perturbation w for a given in-
put image I and target class t by solving (5)
minimize
∥∥∥∥12(tanh(w) + 1)− I
∥∥∥∥2
2
+c·f
(
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)
)
(5)
where c is a constant and f is defined as in (6)
f (A) = max (max {Z (A)i : i 6= t} − Z (A)t ,−κ) (6)
where Z is the activation function and κ is the confidence
parameter, (how confident the classifier should be that the
generated adversarial image is a sample of the target class).
In this work, we use a non-targeted setup so that t is any
incorrect class.
Cleverhans module [10] was used for implementing the
attacks. Each attack was trained in an untargeted setup
and defended on three different pretrained network archi-
tectures: Inception v3 (IncV3) [13], InceptionResNet v2
(IncresV2) [12], and ResNet50 v3 (Res50V3) [8].
The experiments aim that all attacks are successful, i.e.,
the adversarial image generated by the attack network is
misclassified by the defense network. To this end,  parame-
ter is used for FGSM and MIM attacks and iteration param-
eter is used for C&W L2 to find the minimum L2 making
the attack successful for each image. The images are down-
scaled to 224x224 for Res50v3 and they are kept at their
original resolution (229x299) for IncV3 and IncresV2. For
all attack types, the Gaussian kernel size is set to match the
size of the image and it has a standard deviation of 190.
For FGSM attack,  parameter is selected as 10.0 at the
first iteration and decreased by 0.025 until the minimum 
Figure 2: L2 distance improvements with respect to base
attack for different attack types and networks
which makes the defense network misclassify the adversar-
ial image is obtained. If the adversarial attack fails at the
first iteration then  is increased by 5.0 and if it is success-
ful then decreased by 0.025 until the minimum  that makes
the network misclassify the input is obtained.
C&W L2 attack is initialized by setting confidence pa-
rameter to zero. Then the iteration parameter is increased,
as long as the attack is successful, to find the minimum L2
distance.
For MIM attack,  parameter is selected as 0.018 for the
first iteration and decreased by 0.001 until the minimum L2
distance is obtained.
5. Experimental Results
The results are shown in Table 1 for different α val-
ues where baseline refers to the original unmodified attack.
Note that the case where α is 1 still has an effect of reducing
the noise due to the Gaussian smoothing. When α is 0, no
noise is added to the color channels.
Fig. 1 shows baseline adversarial images and the images
obtained with the proposed method for FGSM, C&W L2
and MIM attacks.
Fig. 2 shows L2 distance improvements as percentage of
the baseline attacks. The largest improvement is obtained
for FGSM using Res50V3 where it is improved by 41.27%
and smallest improvement is 5.88% for C&W L2 using In-
cresV3. On average 22% improvement is achieved consid-
ering all attack and network types. Another sample image
and its adversarial counterparts are shown in Fig.3.
6. Discussion
When we reduce the noise in U and V bands, the adver-
sarial images look perceptually better. However, in order to
achieve 100% attack accuracy, stronger attacks, which in-
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Figure 3: A sample image, its adversarial counterparts ob-
tained using different attacks and with the proposed method.
(a) Original image, (b) Baseline adversarial image (FGSM
attack), (c) Adversarial image obtained with α = 0 (FGSM
attack), (d) Baseline adversarial image (C&W L2 attack),
(e) Adversarial image obtained with α = 0 (C&W L2 at-
tack), (f) Baseline adversarial image (MIM attack), (g) Ad-
versarial image obtained with α = 0 (MIM attack)
Table 1: L2 distances for different attacks and different networks using various α values
Method FGSM C&W L2 MIM
IncV3 IncresV2 Res50V3 IncV3 IncresV2 Res50V3 IncV3 IncresV2 Res50V3
Baseline 4.3029 40.02 40.78 0.2285 0.3484 8.0870 0.6012 0.8290 0.3859
α = 1 3.3605 36.98 30.19 0.1996 0.3478 7.1845 0.5932 0.7492 0.3190
α = 0.8 3.7134 35.17 28.14 0.1888 0.3382 7.1365 0.5411 0.6857 0.3052
α = 0.6 4.3884 33.12 25.54 0.181 0.3279 7.1373 0.4995 0.6662 0.2947
α = 0.4 4.1897 31.72 24.04 0.1782 0.3306 7.3007 0.4712 0.6474 0.2877
α = 0.2 4.6203 30.71 23.95 0.1795 0.3306 7.3007 0.4589 0.6431 0.2846
α = 0 6.3628 35.72 25.87 0.1863 0.3425 7.4638 0.4638 0.6486 0.2854
crease the noise in Y, are needed as a trade-off. However, as
can be seen in Table 1, lower L2 distances can still be ob-
tained for all attack types and for all networks. It has to be
noted that the α value giving the best result is different for
each attack. For FGSM, α = 0.2 gives the best results for
IncresV2 and Res50V3 while α = 1 is the best for IncV3.
For C&W L2, α = 0.6 gives the best results for IncresV2
and Res50V3. While α = 0.8 is the best for IncV3, perfor-
mance difference with α = 0.6 is relatively small and it can
be said that, in practice, α = 0.6 can be used for all network
types in question. For MIM, α = 0.2 gives the best results
for all different types of networks in question.
The results show that the proposed method works inde-
pendent of the attack type and the network model and re-
duces the L2 distances. Even though C&W L2 and MIM
attacks are optimized to minimize L2 distance by design,
our method results in still lowerL2 values. While this might
sound contradictory, it has to be noted that due to the nature
of the networks, this optimization is done on RGB values
in the original attacks and might not be optimal when YUV
domain is considered. The proposed method reduces the
noise in U and V channels which is compensated by in-
creasing the noise in Y channel. This strategy reduces the
amount of perceptible color noise as well as reducing the to-
tal noise as indicated by L2 distances calculated using RGB
channels.
Since C&W L2 and MIM generate adversarial noise in
iterative manner, both are able to produce lower L2 distance
than FGSM. C&W L2 attack achieved the best L2 distances
except using ResNet50v3 as the attack network. For this
network, MIM attack achieved the best L2 distance.
7. Conclusion
We proposed an attack and network type agnostic per-
ceptual enhancement method by converting the adversarial
noise to YUV color space and reducing the chrominance
noise and applying Gaussian smoothing to the adversarial
noise. The adversarial images are not only perceptually
better but also have lower L2 distances to the original im-
ages. Conventional networks are trained using images in
RGB color space and inherently, the optimization is done
in this color space. In the future, these networks could be
trained using images in YUV color space. Then using these
networks, attacks could be done intrinsically in YUV space.
The proposed method assumes that the object is located
near the center of the image and Gaussian kernel is po-
sitioned at the center of the image. However the object
could be off-center or could be located in a different po-
sition which might invalidate this assumption. In the future,
class activation maps [14], which could be obtained directly
through the attack network, can be used to estimate the cen-
ter position of the object. This would allow positioning the
Gaussian kernel to overlap better with the object position.
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